Ukrainians and Poles finalize draft joint statement on massacres in Volyn

[Volodya987]

The Polish Nobleman has spoken.
The natives of "The" Polish Borderland, from Yzhhorod to Yedo Bay, cringe in fear.
A native translation of "Border Land":
Bor = wad
Der = ripped
L = jackboot
and = + = mohella
Volodya987
PS. I'm too embarrassed to translate, what "Polish" means,
to a Nobleman

[Volodya987]

Correction: Bor = war
Volodya987

[Zbyszek]

Let us ignore improper remarks of Volodya.

On the morning July 11, 1943, in the middle of a terrible war, not even one Polish inhabitant of Poryck could imagine the scope of tragedy.
It was a Sunday morning. The Catholic community of Poryck attended the longer mass called suma. The priest got a warning from a local Ukrainian named Kulaj, that the church is going to be attacked by the Ukrainian nationalists. Kulaj tried to discourage people from attending the mass but they could not believe him.
Just before the celebration, three Ukrainian UPA sympathizers entered the church. The aggressive nationalist propaganda had been spread throughout the region and the saying smert Lakham became popular already.
A panic rose and rose in the church. People tried to escape but the church building had already been encircled. People looked for any possible shelters, they hid behind the pillars but the attackers fired through the open door of the church. In a few minutes they were inside, stopped near the altar, threw the hand grenades and fired at helpless people. Finally, they systematically walked between the wounded and gave them shots in the head. Then, they tried to set fire but the lucky rain came from heaven in time.
At least 220 people were murdered in Poryck. It was a drop in the Volhynian inferno where about 60 000 Poles (predominantly civilians) were butchered in July 1943.
Three nationalist groups operated in the region: banderovtsi, melnikovtsi and bulbovtsi.
It should be noted that Poles were a weak community in the region (Ukrainians 68%, Poles 16.6%, Jews 9.9%, some Czech settlers) and they were taken by an absolute surprise. Later on they responded with inadequate self-defence and also in terror. Ukrainian historians estimate (but do not give any detailed study) that 15 000 Ukrainians died in the Polish hands.
60 years later, the presidents of Poland and Ukraine are going to meet and shake hands in Poryck/Pavlivka (The Soviets changed a name of Poryck after WWII).
It will be a very importatnt day for two countries.
It should be appreciated that the Ukrainian partners agreed to celebrate the tragic events in spite of strong nationalist opposition. The nationalists in Poland would like to separate the events from more general assessment of Polish-Ukrainian history. The objective reserachers try to find explanation in the oppresion of Ukrainian nation by the prewar Polish authorities.
One thing should be pointed out in my opinion. Such an extensive bloodshed could not be possible without the external circumstances imposed by the Soviet and the Nazi German governments. Much of the blame should be directly attributed to fascists and communists.
Those who are interested in some delicate aspects of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation can read a report prepared by Kasia Wolczuk:

http://www.uanews.tv/archives/rferl/ukraine/ua57.htm

This report was written by Kataryna Wolczuk, a lecturer at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, European Research Institute, the University of Birmingham, U.K., and co-author of "Poland and Ukraine: a Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe?" (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002).




[Edited by Zbyszek on 9th July 2003 at 12:03]

[Zbyszek]

I decided to quote the whole content of Kasia's report because I found it objective and interesting.

Since the mid-1990s, the Polish and Ukrainian political classes have fostered a close partnership with the aim of building relations based on a commonality of interests, something that is a unique example of close bilateral cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. But cooperative relations between Poland and Ukraine at the state level camouflage disquiet at the societal level, where memories of past persecution and suffering continue to alienate the neighbors from one other. In this context, the preparations to commemorate Poles who died at the hands of Ukrainians in the mid-1940s may revive old antagonisms and introduce new strains into the relationship.

The "war within a war" took place between Poles and Ukrainians in the shadow of bigger battles of World War II, when both tried to assert their control over the eastern fringes of prewar Poland, i.e., modern-day western Ukraine, in a series of bloody encounters that claimed thousands of victims on both sides. The military wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), conducted "ethnic cleansing" that resulted in between 60,000 and 100,000 Polish deaths. The killings, which started in March 1943 and carried on until early 1944, were intended to "cleanse" Volhynia and eastern Galicia by provoking the mass exodus of the Polish population to prepare the area for a Ukrainian takeover. It was not only the sheer scale and brutality of the killings that shocked the Poles but also the fact that the UPA units were often assisted by peasants from neighboring Ukrainian villages. In turn, the UPA actions elicited reprisals on the part of the Poles in which approximately 15,000 to 30,000 Ukrainians died.

In December 2002, in a letter to the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, Viktor Medvedchuk, Marek Siwiec, head of the Polish Bureau of National Security, outlined the Polish view of how the events ought to be commemorated. Apart from marking and renovating the graves of the slain Poles, erecting a monument to them, and being granted access to Ukrainian archives, Poland suggested that the Ukrainian president make an appropriate symbolic gesture of apology for the atrocities. Siwiec suggested that at the culmination of the commemoration at a ceremony in Volhynia in July this year, the Ukrainian president make a historical gesture akin to that of German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who knelt before the Monument of the Heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1970. These plans for the commemoration are likely to have some reverberations within Ukraine and Poland, as well as the potential to adversely affect relations between the two states.

First, Polish demands elicit diverse reactions within Ukrainian society. Ukrainian political and intellectual elites, along with historians, remain profoundly divided in their attitudes to the UPA, which range from condemnation to glorification. In line with Soviet-era historiography, which depicted the OUN and UPA as bourgeois nationalists and Nazi collaborators, left-wing parties in Ukraine refuse to recognize, let alone acclaim, these organizations as patriotic. In contrast, the center-right and radical right-wing parties, which have their power base in western Ukraine, consider the OUN and UPA as a high point of the national-liberation movement. This view is shared by the population of western Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora, but is not, however, easily transplanted to the rest of Ukraine, where most people remain either ambivalent toward, or hostile to, these organizations. As a result, there is a reluctance to embark on exposing the wrongdoings of the national-liberation movement along the lines suggested by the Poles (who condemn the OUN and UPA as criminal organizations) at a time when their actual role is either widely unknown or questioned.

Moreover, Ukraine lacks an individual with the moral authority from within the political elite to express an apology on behalf of the nation. President Leonid Kuchma, while remaining the head of the state and coordinating the commemorations on behalf of the Ukrainian side, lost any moral right to speak in the name of the nation in 2000 when he was implicated in a killing of a journalist and other misdeeds. Also, the issue may be politicized in the run-up to the presidential elections next year. The most popular contender, Viktor Yushchenko, is strongly supported in western Ukraine, where the UPA is praised for its role in fighting for an independent Ukraine. In pursuit of political gain, the exposure of the UPA's deeds may be used to label Yushchenko as a nationalist UPA sympathizer, something that is likely to discredit him in other parts of Ukraine, where people's views of the OUN and UPA are based on Soviet-era propaganda claims of the OUN and UPA as Nazi collaborators.

Furthermore, Poland's plans for the commemoration expose the asymmetry characterizing Polish-Ukrainian relations. The prevailing attitude in Poland is that it has the right to expect an apology from Ukraine. Some openly hint that Ukraine "owes" this to Poland, especially given the latter's role as Ukraine's bridge to the West. And Ukrainian President Kuchma, keen to limit his isolation, may be willing to meet Polish demands. Perhaps more disturbing for the Ukrainians is the thought that Poland is exploiting this asymmetrical relationship to impose on Ukraine its own version of history in which it depicts the Ukrainian guerrilla movement as criminal. The pursuit of "apology by diktat" threatens to alienate the proponents of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in Ukraine. This would be a setback for genuine reconciliation at the societal level.

Within Poland, the situation is no less complex, as Polish authorities come under considerable pressure from Poles resettled after the war from Poland's eastern borderlands, including Volhynia and Galicia. Their views on wartime events lay bare all the resentment that has been festering in the collective memory of Poles traumatized by their experiences at the hands of Ukrainians. They adhere to a scheme of Polish-Ukrainian history, which is informed by personal memories of suffering, in which Poles are viewed as victims of genocide by Ukrainian criminal organizations.

So far, the Polish political class has adopted a strategy of pushing historical grievances to one side, but this is criticized as "appeasement" by right-wing forces in Poland. Fearing a radicalization of attitudes, the Polish leadership has taken the lead in staging the commemoration to prevent an escalation of tensions. However, Poland▓s decision to commemorate the death of ethnic Poles (and Ukrainians who suffered protecting the Poles) and leave aside the ethnic Ukrainians (who died at the hands of Poles in reprisals) means that an opportunity is being missed to turn the anniversary into a more inclusive, conciliatory remembrance of victims of interethnic violence.

The plans for the commemoration also testify to the difficulties that historians face in diverging from the established scheme of history that is centered on the martyrdom of the nation. While factual data on the killings have been amassed, Polish and Ukrainian historians have engaged in heated debates over the motives behind the UPA actions, and, in particular, whether they constituted deliberate genocide or not. The range of terms used to describe Ukrainian actions go from "genocide," "ethnic cleansing" and "mass murder" to the quite mild "anti-Polish actions."

At the same time, popularized accounts of atrocities continue to take precedence over debates on the reasons for hostilities in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. As Bogumila Berdychowska, a Polish advocate for Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, put it, "our common history did not start in 1943"; grievances that found their violent culmination in 1943-44 accumulated over a longer period of time. The killings had their roots in the political, social, and economic background to interethnic relations, as well as wartime developments, e.g., Polish interwar policies toward the Ukrainian minority, as well as Soviet and German wartime provocations. But any acknowledgement of this complexity is largely missing from the official proclamations and media coverage of the subject in Poland.

If carefully staged, the commemoration of Volhynia may help to deal with painful historical legacies in Polish-Ukrainian relations. But the chances are that it may actually contribute to the renewal of prejudice and negative stereotypes. After nearly 15 years of independence, historical reconciliation at the societal level between Poland and Ukraine still remains a distant goal.

[NZman]

Wolczuk is a Pollack Find out about her at her at the Uni-site.
http://www.crees.bham.ac.uk/staff/wolczuk/index.htm

Pollacks only find Pollacks objective.


Simple question for you Zbyszek the Pollack... Why are you posting on Ukraine.com when you only wanna talk about how great it is to be a Pollack...

Smacks of understanding you're aware of how sh1te donkey riding is

Love the NZman

[Zbyszek]

NZman, regardless of how un friendly your note is, thank you for you info. Wolczuk graduated from a Polish University but her name is Ukrainian and she is probably of a mixed ancestry like dr. Wiktor Poliszczuk. DO not forget there are maybe half a million of Ukrainians living in Poland now.
I just think Kataryna is fair with her opinion.
Regards
Zbigniew

[NZman]

Originally posted by Zbyszek
NZman, regardless of how un friendly your note is, thank you for you info. Wolczuk graduated from a Polish University but her name is Ukrainian and she is probably of a mixed ancestry like dr. Wiktor Poliszczuk. DO not forget there are maybe half a million of Ukrainians living in Poland now.
I just think Kataryna is fair with her opinion.
Regards
Zbigniew

Is it necessary to determine Kasia's nationality?

Abso-bloody-lutely... Nationality influences everything dude...

Look at her web-site again dude she has married a dude called Wolczuk...

You would think she's fair - she's a Pollack...

Again dude why are you posting on a Ukraine site when all you wanna pap on about is Poland... I'm a Kiwi and you don't get me cryin' all over OZ.com.

Why don't you sod off to a Pollack site and kiss up to all the Pollacks in the world.

I can only guess you has a chip on your shoulder that would put the Jocks to shame

Love the NZman